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Abstract
We investigate the impact on regional welfare of policy competition for FDI when
a multinational ﬁrm can strategically react to diﬀerences in statutory corporate tax
rates and shift taxable proﬁts to lower-tax jurisdictions. We show that competing
governments may have an incentive to tax discriminate between domestic and multi-
national ﬁrms even in the presence of proﬁt shifting opportunities for the latter. In
particular, tax competition leads to higher welfare for the region as a whole than
lump-sum subsidy competition when the diﬀerence in statutory corporate tax rates
and/or their average is high enough. We also ﬁnd that policy competition increases
regional welfare by changing the ﬁrm’s investment decision when proﬁt shifting mo-
tivations might induce the ﬁrm to locate in the least proﬁtable country.
Keywords: Policy competition for FDI; Proﬁt shifting; Tax discrimination
JEL Classiﬁcation: F23; H25; H26; H32; H73
∗We wish to thank Giacomo Calzolari, Ronald B. Davies, Marina Di Giacomo, Jean Hindriks, Diego
Piacentino, Pierre M. Picard, Federico Revelli, Francesca Sanna-Randaccio, Jacques Thisse, Hylke Van-
denbussche, as well as seminar participants at the University of Bologna, at the 10푡ℎ ETSG Annual
Conference, at the 푋푋 SIEP Annual Conference, at the ASSET 2008 Annual Meeting, and at the SIE
2009 Annual Meeting, for valuable comments and suggestions.
†Department of Economics, University of Bologna, Strada Maggiore 45, 40125 Bologna, Italy; and
ENEA, Lungotevere Thaon di Revel 76, 00196 Rome, Italy. E-mail: oscar.amerighi@unibo.it
‡Department of Economics, University of Strathclyde, Sir William Duncan Building, 130 Rotten-
row, Glasgow G4 0GE, UK; and Department of Economics, University of Salerno, Italy. E-mail:
giuseppe.defeo@strath.ac.uk
1 Introduction
Sandoz [...] is trying to exploit latent tax competition between Germany,
Austria and Switzerland [...]. The group, the generics subsidiary of Switzer-
land’s Novartis, has been based in Vienna since its creation last year. But
[...] is considering a move to Munich or Basel [and it] has asked all three
countries to state what they could oﬀer in terms of taxes and other beneﬁts.
(Financial Times, April 14, 2005)
Foreign direct investment plans reported to the South Korean government
fell 9.6 per cent last year [...] The fall in FDI plans was expected as a tax
reduction period for foreign investors had been cut to seven years from 10
years from the beginning of 2005. The [Commerce] ministry said: “It will
be diﬃcult for the FDI to increase signiﬁcantly because of [...] competition
with a neighboring country.” (Financial Times, January 6, 2006)
The ones above are just two of the many examples illustrating the importance of taxes
and ﬁscal incentives for the investment decisions of multinational ﬁrms. In addition, they
put forward the idea that countries compete against each other in order to attract foreign
investors within their national borders.
In recent years, indeed, governments throughout the world - at the national or sub-
national level - have designed and implemented policies with the aim of attracting foreign
direct investments (FDI). Competition for foreign investments in major production fa-
cilities mostly occurs at an intra-regional level, i.e., between countries belonging to the
same geographic or economic area (e.g., Latin America, South-East Asia, Central and
Eastern Europe) or between regions within the same country. The incentives oﬀered
to foreign investors often consist in corporate tax reductions, tax breaks, tax holidays,
investment tax allowances, or other kinds of speciﬁc tax concessions. For instance,
during the 1990s, Brazil has experienced several cases of inter-regional competition for
FDI in the automobile sector, and ﬁscal incentives typically included state and local
tax holidays (for as long as ten years) in addition to tax breaks on imported materials.
In Western Europe, over the last 20 years, Ireland has successfully employed incentive
packages - including a considerable lowering of corporate taxes - to attract FDI. In 1998
the Czech government, after having lost potential FDI inﬂows in previous years in favor
of neighboring countries - like Hungary and Poland - eventually approved a package of
incentives including corporate tax relief for ten years for newly-established companies
in the country.1
The empirical evidence focuses mainly on how taxes aﬀect the volume and distri-
bution of FDI (see, e.g., De Mooij and Ederveen, 2003, for a survey). But there are
contributions that analyze more speciﬁcally the impact of corporate taxation on ﬁrms’
1All of these examples are taken from Charlton (2003). For an overview of the policy-competition-
for-FDI issue, see Oman (2001).
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location decisions.2 On the one hand, Devereux and Griﬃth (1998) ﬁnd a signiﬁcant
eﬀect of eﬀective average tax rates on the location choice of subsidiaries of U.S. ﬁrms
within Europe. On the other hand, Buettner and Ruf (2007) show that statutory tax
rates are at least as important as labor cost diﬀerences for explaining the observed lo-
cation decisions of German multinationals. Moreover, the statutory tax rate is found to
have a considerably stronger predictive power than the eﬀective average tax rate, and
this “might indicate that multinationals take account of proﬁt-shifting opportunities in
the choice of location of their subsidiaries” (Buettner and Ruf, 2007, p. 162).
The relationship between corporate taxation and the location of multinational ﬁrms
is an important issue on the political agenda of both the European Union and the OECD.
There is general agreement on the idea that national corporate tax systems should not
discriminate between taxation of purely domestic and of multinational ﬁrms. The non-
discrimination principle is recommended by both the European Union and the OECD
(European Communities, 1992, 1998; OECD, 1998) to counter “harmful” tax competi-
tion between governments seeking to attract investments by foreign multinational ﬁrms.
In such a sense, one of the major attempts worldwide to limit policy competition for
FDI is represented by State Aid Control in the European Union. If a EU Member
State lowers the tax rate or grants other types of tax advantages only to certain sectors
or to certain types of ﬁrms (e.g., coordination centers for multinational ﬁrms in Bel-
gium) or to enterprises located in a certain area within the Member State, this would
constitute State aid. The EU State Aid Control system should prevent countries from
oﬀering subsidies in order to attract foreign investors. In spite of that, Vandenbuss-
che and Tan (2005) provide empirical evidence of a more favorable tax treatment for
foreign multinationals compared to similar domestic ﬁrms in Belgium. As their results
are not driven by proﬁt shifting issues, there should exist other ﬁscal incentives besides
cross-country tax diﬀerentials to justify lower tax payments by multinational ﬁrms. A
possible interpretation is that the country oﬀers speciﬁc ﬁscal incentives (in terms of,
e.g., under-the-counter subsidies) to foreign investors.
From a theoretical viewpoint, the literature about policy competition for FDI typi-
cally addresses the questions as to which country wins the competition and whether the
winner, in equilibrium, taxes or subsidizes the foreign ﬁrm. In particular, the strand
that accounts for imperfect product market competition, country-size asymmetry, and
intra-regional trade costs, develops from the contribution by Hauﬂer and Wooton (1999,
henceforth H&W). This paper analyzes competition between countries of unequal mar-
ket size trying to attract a foreign-owned monopolist. In equilibrium, the big country
succeeds in attracting FDI since the ﬁrm prefers locating in the big market in order to
save on trade costs, and the country can even levy a lump-sum tax on the foreign ﬁrm’s
proﬁts if the size diﬀerence is large enough. Ferrett and Wooton (2005) extend H&W’s
2At the sub-national level, Bartik (1985) shows that the corporate tax rate has a signiﬁcant impact
on business location decisions within the U.S. Subsequent empirical studies on interregional location
decisions have conﬁrmed this result. See Phillipps and Goss (1995) for a survey.
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model to study policy competition for investments by two ﬁrms from the same industry
and show that either one ﬁrm locates in each country and all of the ﬁrms’ proﬁts are
taxed away by host countries or the big country is able to attract both ﬁrms by taxing
them due to its market access advantage. Hence, tax competition under duopoly would
not necessarily create a “race to the bottom” in corporate tax rates. Bjorvatn and
Eckel (2006) modify H&W’s set-up by introducing a private competitor for the foreign
investor in the big country. The equilibrium policy may be either a subsidy or a tax
depending on whether the location advantages oﬀered by the two countries are similar
or not. An interesting result is that aggregate welfare (the sum of regional welfare and
the investor’s proﬁts) rises whenever the introduction of policy competition changes the
investor’s location decision. Finally, in a simpler but more general model, Ferrett and
Wooton (2006) show that tax/subsidy competition for mobile plants is not aﬀected by
the international distribution of ﬁrm ownership. Policy competition, indeed, equalizes
the ﬁrm’s after-tax proﬁts across countries, thereby making capital owners indiﬀerent
to the location of production. However, none of these papers takes into account the
fact that multinational ﬁrms consider proﬁt-shifting opportunities when choosing the
location of their subsidiaries, and most of them lack a regional welfare analysis of policy
competition.3
Our paper aims at investigating the impact on regional welfare of policy competition
for FDI when the foreign multinational can strategically react to diﬀerences in statutory
corporate tax rates and shift taxable proﬁts to lower-tax jurisdictions. In particular,
we want to understand whether it can be welfare-improving for the region as a whole
that countries compete against each other by oﬀering further tax incentives when their
national corporate tax systems already give the multinational some opportunities to
minimize its worldwide tax liabilities. Our main result indicates that, in the presence of
proﬁt shifting, tax discrimination might be more desirable - in terms of regional welfare
- than subsidy competition as a policy instrument to attract FDI. This raises doubts
about the pertinence of the non-discrimination principle in the European Union context.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present and justify the
main assumptions and the structure of the theoretical framework we use to analyze policy
competition for FDI. In Section 3, we analyze a set-up where no proﬁt shifting takes
place and discuss the welfare implications of policy competition. Section 4 introduces
the possibility of proﬁt shifting in response to statutory tax rate diﬀerentials. We then
perform an analysis that parallels that of the previous Section and compare the results.
Finally, Section 5 summarizes the main conclusions emerging from this work.
3Fumagalli (2003) investigates the eﬀects on regional welfare of subsidy competition for FDI when
the location of the multinational ﬁrm exerts a positive externality in terms of a technological spillover
to local ﬁrms. One of the competing countries beneﬁts more from the inward investment but, in the
absence of incentives, the other, more advanced, country is the multinational’s preferred location. Hence,
subsidies may increase regional welfare by inducing the multinational to locate where it generates the
highest welfare gains.
3
2 The model
We develop a model in which two potential host countries, 퐴 and 퐵, belonging to the
same region (be it a political, economic or geographical area) compete between them to
attract investments by a foreign-owned ﬁrm from a third-country outside the region -
we call the latter country 퐹 and we can think of it as the rest of the world. Once located
in the region, the ﬁrm will be the only supplier of some ﬁnal good to the consumers of
the whole area where it will thus behave as a monopoly. To this end, it must establish
a production facility in either 퐴 or 퐵.4
We want to investigate the regional welfare eﬀects of policy competition for FDI when
the foreign multinational can strategically react to diﬀerences in corporate tax rates and
shift taxable proﬁts to lower-tax jurisdictions. Hence, we represent policy competition
as a three-stage game with complete information characterized by the following sequence
of decisions:
∙ In stage 1, the governments of countries 퐴 and 퐵 simultaneously and irreversibly
post bids to attract the foreign investor.
∙ In stage 2, the foreign multinational decides whether to establish its production
plant in 퐴 or in 퐵, and realizes proﬁts by serving the regional market.
∙ In stage 3, the foreign multinational chooses the amount of proﬁts to declare to
the tax authorities of the countries where it operates, that is either 퐴 or 퐵 and 퐹 .
We solve our three-stage game by backward induction to ﬁnd its subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. Such a game structure is similar to the one used
by Bernheim and Whinston (1998) to analyze exclusive dealing contracts. In their
model, two manufacturers simultaneously bid for representation by a retailer; then,
the latter chooses to represent one (or both or neither) manufacturer; and ﬁnally, the
retailer enters into a contract with the party it has chosen to represent. In our model,
we restrict the strategy set of the agent (the foreign multinational) to the choice of
only one principal (the country where it will invest). In addition, we assume complete
information throughout the paper whereas an asymmetric information problem arises
in the third stage of their model.5
We discuss the impact on regional welfare of three alternative forms of policy com-
petition for FDI relative to the no policy competition scenario where the multinational
ﬁrm faces exogenous statutory corporate proﬁt tax rates. Under subsidy competition, we
4Exports of the ﬁnal good from country 퐹 are not a viable option for the foreign ﬁrm if we assume
that trade costs between country 퐹 and the region are prohibitively high. On the other hand, assuming
that the costs for intra-regional trade are low enough rules out the possibility that duplicating a costly
investment, i.e. setting up two production plants, one in 퐴 and one in 퐵, is a proﬁtable strategy for the
foreign ﬁrm.
5A possible extension to our paper could treat the relative proﬁtability of alternative locations and/or
the value of outside options as private information of the multinational ﬁrm.
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let the two countries compete for FDI by oﬀering lump-sum subsidies 푆푖 (푖 = 퐴,퐵) to
the foreign multinational, that still faces exogenous statutory tax rates. In the other two
policy competition scenarios, governments are allowed to tax discriminate between do-
mestic and multinational ﬁrms. In particular, under non-linear tax competition, which
we will also call perfect tax discrimination, we let them choose an ad hoc corporate
tax package for the multinational ﬁrm; such a package consists of a corporate tax rate
휏푖 ∈ [0, 1] - that country 푖 applies just to the proﬁts the multinational ﬁrm declares there
- and of a lump-sum tax (or entrance fee) 푇푖 (푖 = 퐴,퐵). On the other hand, under tax
competition, or tax discrimination, the only ﬁscal policy instrument at the governments’
disposal is the corporate tax rate 휏푖 ∈ [0, 1] (푖 = 퐴,퐵).
We ﬁrst analyze a situation where declared proﬁts in one country coincide with those
actually realized there. We then discuss the impact of proﬁt shifting opportunities by
allowing for proﬁt misdeclaration when corporate tax rates diﬀer across countries.
2.1 Proﬁts of the multinational ﬁrm
We denote by Π푖 (푖 = 퐴,퐵) the before-tax or operating proﬁts that the multinational
ﬁrm realizes when it locates its production plant in country 푖. They represent the proﬁts
that the ﬁrm earns by selling the ﬁnal good to all the consumers of the region.6
The before-tax proﬁtability of the two countries is not the same from the foreign
ﬁrm’s perspective. For instance, one country might represent a cheaper production
location than the other or it might ensure an easier access to speciﬁc inputs (e.g., high-
skilled workers, raw materials, etc.) for the foreign ﬁrm. Similarly, in the presence
of intra-regional trade costs, diﬀerences in country - notably, market - size might be
relevant for the ﬁrm’s location decision. In what follows, we assume, without loss of
generality, that country 퐵 is the best location for the ﬁrm’s production plant in the
absence of tax motivations, i.e. it beneﬁts from a location advantage over country 퐴:
Assumption 1 Π퐵 > Π퐴 > 0
Assumption 1 further implies that the foreign ﬁrm has always an incentive to invest in
the region regardless of any tax incentive oﬀered by the two countries. In such a sense,
Π퐴 and Π퐵 may be considered as the extra-proﬁts that the foreign multinational obtains
by locating in the region with respect to some outside option from investing somewhere
else.
Fiscal considerations, however, might play a role in driving the investment decision of
the foreign multinational. As it is common in the literature, we assume that international
corporate taxation follows the source principle, so that proﬁts are taxed where they are
6Before-tax proﬁts may include any kind of ﬁxed and/or variable production costs. Note also that
ﬁxed set-up costs do not aﬀect the investment decision of the multinational as long as they are symmetric
across the two countries. In this case, treating them as tax-deductible or non-tax-deductible does not
change our results.
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generated.7 To this end, we denote by 푡퐴, 푡퐵 ∈ [0, 1] the statutory corporate tax rates set
by countries 퐴 and 퐵, respectively. Similarly, we let country 퐹 tax the proﬁts declared
by the multinational ﬁrm in its residence country at the rate 푡퐹 ∈ [0, 1]. These are
the legally imposed rates of corporate taxation which, in principle, should be applied in
order to determine tax liabilities of both domestic and foreign ﬁrms operating within
one country’s national borders. To make the analysis of policy competition for FDI
interesting, we assume that country 퐵 has a ﬁscal disadvantage relative to country 퐴:8
Assumption 2 푡퐵 > 푡퐴
In this way, the foreign multinational always faces a trade-oﬀ when deciding in which
country to invest.
We do not make any other speciﬁc assumption about the relationship between the
three countries’ statutory tax rates. We want to stress, however, that any tax rate
diﬀerential creates proﬁt shifting opportunities for the multinational ﬁrm. In fact, ﬁrms
engaging in horizontal (or vertical) FDI own ﬁscal entities at diﬀerent locations and can
shift proﬁts from high-tax to low-tax jurisdictions in many diﬀerent ways: for instance,
by manipulating transfer prices on intra-ﬁrm traded goods; or by allocating high-interest
debt to high-tax jurisdictions; or even by re-assigning common expenses to aﬃliates in
high-tax countries. All of these techniques allow a multinational ﬁrm to minimize its
worldwide tax bill while imposing signiﬁcant accounting and other costs on the ﬁrm
itself.9
To account for the possibility of proﬁt misdeclaration, we denote by 휋푖 and 휋퐹 the
amount of proﬁts that the multinational ﬁrm declares to country 푖 and country 퐹 tax
authorities, respectively, and we postulate that they may diﬀer from the proﬁts that the
ﬁrm actually realizes at each location, denoted by Π푖 and Π퐹 . Our argument is that the
ﬁrm has to declare the totality of its worldwide proﬁts, i.e. 휋푖 + 휋퐹 = Π푖 + Π퐹 , but it
may choose how to allocate taxable proﬁts across the countries where it operates in an
attempt to minimize its overall tax liability. Hence, declared and realized proﬁts in one
country need not coincide. In particular, the amount of proﬁts that the ﬁrm shifts from
country 푖 to country 퐹 (or the other way around) in response to cross-country tax rate
diﬀerentials is given by 휋푠 ≡ 휋푖−Π푖 = Π퐹 − 휋퐹 . It is evident that, if the ﬁrm wishes to
declare more proﬁts than those actually realized in country 푖 (휋푖 > Π푖), it has to declare
less proﬁts than those actually realized in its residence country (휋퐹 < Π퐹 ).
7Keen (1993), for instance, argues that the eﬀective taxation of multinational ﬁrms is source-based,
even though tax codes may stipulate diﬀerently.
8It should be clear that if country 퐵 enjoys both a location and a ﬁscal advantage over country 퐴,
policy competition cannot turn the latter into a more attractive location for FDI.
9The existence of proﬁt shifting - notably, from the United States to low-tax countries (or tax
havens) - is widely documented. See Hines (1999) for a comprehensive survey of the empirical literature
on this issue. Bartelsman and Beetsma (2003) have recently provided evidence that proﬁt shifting
opportunities exist among OECD countries as well. For an exhaustive overview of the theoretical
literature on international taxation and of its connections with empirical observations, we refer the
reader to Gresik (2001).
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Proﬁt shifting entails some costs, which may involve expected ﬁnes or hiring tax
experts in order to conceal any proﬁt misdeclaration from tax authorities. We assume
these costs to be increasing in the diﬀerence between realized and declared proﬁts, that
is in the amount of proﬁts that the ﬁrm reallocates across the two countries, and we
let them also depend on an exogenous parameter, 훾 ≥ 0, which might reﬂect govern-
ments’ intensity in controlling tax avoidance by multinational ﬁrms, or, alternatively,
international tax base mobility. More speciﬁcally, the costs for proﬁt shifting in either
direction, i.e., out of (into) country 푖 into (out of) country 퐹 , are given by:
퐶 (훾,Π푖 − 휋푖) = 훾
2
(Π푖 − 휋푖)2 , 푖 = 퐴,퐵
As it shall become clear below, such a cost speciﬁcation leads to the result that tax
motivations make the multinational ﬁrm shift the same amount of proﬁts irrespective of
the level of realized proﬁts.10 If we assumed, instead, following Hines and Rice (1994)
and Huizinga and Laeven (2007), that the costs of proﬁt shifting are proportional to the
ratio of shifted to realized proﬁts, the amount of proﬁt shifting would depend on the
level of the proﬁts realized in the higher-tax country. This, however, does not seem to
provide additional insights into the issue we are interested in with respect to the cost
formulation we adopt. Moreover, it has a major drawback in that we would need to
analyze diﬀerent tax scenarios depending on how 푡퐴 and 푡퐵 compare to 푡퐹 and between
them.
The objective of the multinational ﬁrm is to pick the location which maximizes its
after-tax proﬁts. Since it evaluates both proﬁt shifting opportunities and possible ﬁscal
incentives when taking such a decision, its after-tax proﬁts from investing in country 푖
can be written as follows:
Π푖 = Π푖 + Π퐹 − 푡푖휋푖 − 푡퐹 (Π푖 + Π퐹 − 휋푖)− 훾
2
(Π푖 − 휋푖)2 + 푆푖, 푖 = 퐴,퐵 (1)
where
∙ 푆푖 = 0 under no policy competition;
∙ 푆푖 > 0 under subsidy competition (for given statutory tax rates);
∙ 푡푖 = 휏푖 and 푆푖 = −푇푖 < 0 under perfect tax discrimination;
∙ 푡푖 = 휏푖 and 푆푖 = 0 under tax discrimination.
2.2 Governments and welfare
We assume that the governments of countries 퐴 and 퐵 are both interested in maxi-
mizing national social welfare and that they decide their ﬁscal policies to attract FDI
10The proﬁt-shifting cost function we use here is common in the literature. See, e.g., Swenson (2001),
Kind et al. (2005), Peralta et al. (2006), and Amerighi (2008).
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independently. In particular, we let the social welfare of country 푖 when investment
takes place in country 푗 take the following form
푊 푖푗 =
⎧⎨⎩
푆퐵푖푖 + 푇푅푖 − 푆푖 if 푖 = 푗
푆퐵푖푗 otherwise
(2)
with 푖, 푗 = 퐴,퐵, and where 푇푅푖 = 푡푖휋푖 ≥ 0 denotes the revenue arising from taxation
of the proﬁts declared by the multinational ﬁrm to country 푖’s tax authorities, and 푆푖
measures either the lump-sum subsidy paid to attract FDI (under subsidy competition)
or the entrance fee charged to the foreign ﬁrm (under perfect tax discrimination). These
components of country 푖’s welfare function are equal to zero when investment takes place
in country 푗.
The ﬁrst term of the welfare function in (2) captures all the other components of
social welfare that are aﬀected by the investment decision of the foreign multinational
but that do not depend on the amount of proﬁts the latter declares in country 푖. For
example, domestic consumer surplus, proﬁt dividends to domestic residents from other
ﬁrms in the economy, labor market conditions, etc. We call 푆퐵푖푗 the social beneﬁts for
country 푖 when FDI goes to country 푗 and we denote by Δ푆퐵푖 ≡ 푆퐵푖푖−푆퐵푖푗 ≥ 0 the gain
to country 푖 from inward FDI. In fact, country 푖 may beneﬁt from hosting the foreign
ﬁrm because domestic consumer surplus is higher - when there are costs for shipping
the ﬁnal good within the region - or due to other social beneﬁts for the country itself
in terms of, e.g., job-creating opportunities, vertical linkages with domestic suppliers,
technological spillovers which enhance the productivity of local ﬁrms in other sectors,
and so on.11
To focus on the role ﬁscal policies play to attract FDI in the presence of proﬁt shift-
ing, we make the simplifying assumption that the gain in terms of social beneﬁts from
receiving the investment of the foreign multinational is the same for the two countries:
Assumption 3 Δ푆퐵퐴 = Δ푆퐵퐵
This allows us to analyze policy competition by using the following reduced form of
the welfare function in (2)
푊 푖푗 =
⎧⎨⎩
푇푅푖 − 푆푖 if 푖 = 푗
0 otherwise
(3)
11Of course, inward FDI may also generate negative externalities, which would lower the gain to
the country from hosting the foreign ﬁrm: e.g., the industrial wastes of the production facility may
contaminate the surrounding environment. In reality, however, national governments seem to value
more the potential beneﬁts from FDI as they are often prone to oﬀer incentives to attract foreign
investors within their borders.
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3 No proﬁt shifting
We ﬁrst analyze the basic set-up where we do not allow the foreign multinational to
reallocate taxable proﬁts in response to cross-country tax diﬀerentials. Hence, our model
reduces to a two-stage game where the proﬁts declared to one country’s tax authorities
coincide with those earned by operating there, i.e., 휋푖 = Π푖, 푖 = 퐴,퐵, 퐹 .
In the absence of policy competition for FDI between countries 퐴 and 퐵, the foreign
multinational invests in country 퐵 if the latter’s location advantage outweighs its ﬁscal
disadvantage with respect to country 퐴. In particular, FDI goes to country 퐵 as long
as the following condition holds:
(1− 푡퐵) Π퐵 > (1− 푡퐴) Π퐴 (4)
Otherwise, tax savings motivations make the foreign ﬁrm choose to invest in the least
proﬁtable (before-taxes) location.
We now investigate how ﬁscal policy competition aﬀects the investment decision of
the multinational. To this end, we assume that the location advantage of country 퐵
cannot be so large - relative to its ﬁscal disadvantage - that this country attracts FDI
by levying a lump-sum tax on the foreign ﬁrm’s proﬁts while keeping its corporate tax
rate 푡퐵 constant:
Assumption 4 (1− 푡퐵) Π퐵 < Π퐴
This is a suﬃcient condition to have a positive subsidy paid by country 퐵 to the foreign
ﬁrm in the absence of proﬁt shifting. As it shall become clear below, Assumption 4 also
implies that country 퐵 can set a positive lump-sum tax on the foreign multinational’s
proﬁts only if 푡퐵 = 0.
We solve our two-stage game backwards and we easily show that the three forms of
ﬁscal policy competition we consider here are equivalent in the absence of proﬁt shifting.
Namely, they always induce the foreign ﬁrm to invest in the country where it beneﬁts
from a location advantage; this, moreover, maximizes aggregate welfare, deﬁned as the
sum of the two countries’ (or regional) welfare, 푊푅푖 = 푊
푖
푖 +푊
푗
푖 , and the multinational’s
after-tax proﬁts, Π푖.
At the second stage, the multinational ﬁrm invests in country 퐵 if and only if
(1− 푡퐵) Π퐵 + 푆퐵 > (1− 푡퐴) Π퐴 + 푆퐴
where the values of 푡푖 and 푆푖 depend on the ﬁrst-stage policy competition scenario.
Under subsidy competition (for given statutory corporate tax rates), the maximum
amount (lump-sum subsidy) that country 푖 is willing to oﬀer to the foreign investor,
푆푚푎푥푖 , consists in the country’s welfare gain from inward FDI. Hence, it is represented
by a full reimbursement of the taxes paid by the multinational ﬁrm on the proﬁts it
declares to country 푖’s tax authorities, i.e., 푆푚푎푥푖 = 푇푅푖 = 푡푖휋푖, 푖 = 퐴,퐵. That is, in
the absence of proﬁt shifting, 푆푚푎푥푖 = 푡푖Π푖. The equilibrium subsidy results from an
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auction where the country representing the most attractive (subsidy inclusive) location
receives the investment by the foreign ﬁrm.12 However, the winning country need not
actually pay its maximum subsidy but just the one which is necessary to outbid the
rival country, which is given by 푆∗푖 ≡ (1− 푡푗) Π푗 +푆푚푎푥푗 − (1− 푡푖) Π푖, 푖, 푗 = 퐴,퐵, 푖 ∕= 푗.
Therefore, if governments bid their maximum subsidies to attract FDI, country 퐵 wins
the auction and investment takes place there if and only if
(1− 푡퐵) Π퐵 + 푆푚푎푥퐵 > (1− 푡퐴) Π퐴 + 푆푚푎푥퐴 ⇐⇒ Π퐵 > Π퐴.
This suggests that subsidy competition cancels out country 퐵’s ﬁscal disadvantage rela-
tive to 퐴. In particular, it always induces the foreign ﬁrm to set up its production plant
in the country where it beneﬁts from a location advantage. It is also straightforward
to check that subsidy competition maximizes aggregate welfare from FDI to country 푖.
Indeed, we have that
푊푅퐵 + Π
퐵 = 푡퐵Π퐵 − 푆∗퐵 + (1− 푡퐵) Π퐵 + 푆∗퐵 = Π퐵 > 푊푅퐴 + Π퐴 = Π퐴
where the equilibrium subsidy is given by 푆∗퐵 = (1− 푡퐴) Π퐴 + 푡퐴Π퐴 − (1− 푡퐵) Π퐵 =
Π퐴 − (1− 푡퐵) Π퐵, which is positive by Assumption 4.
Under perfect tax discrimination or non-linear-tax competition, we assume that coun-
try 퐵’s government chooses an ad hoc corporate tax rate, 휏퐵, which is applied just to the
foreign ﬁrm’s declared proﬁts, and a lump-sum tax (or entrance fee), 푇퐵, to maximize
the revenue it can collect by taxing the multinational ﬁrm. Its ﬁscal policy decision is
constrained by the fact that it is competing with country 퐴. Hence, country 퐵’s oﬀer
has to outbid country 퐴’s best oﬀer to the foreign ﬁrm, which is represented by the
possibility of not paying taxes at all there (휏퐴, 푇퐴) = (0, 0). The problem of country
퐵’s government can then be written as follows:
max
휏퐵 ,푇퐵
휏퐵휋퐵 + 푇퐵
s.t. (1− 휏퐵) Π퐵 − 푇퐵 ≥ Π퐴
where 휋퐵 = Π퐵 as, for the time being, we do not allow the ﬁrm to misdeclare the
proﬁts actually realized at each location. Note that if the constraint of the problem
above were not binding, there would be no real competition for FDI between the two
countries. Then, as we are not interested in cases where policy competition resolves into
a new tax instrument for country 퐵, any ﬁscal package (휏∗퐵, 푇
∗
퐵) satisfying the constraint
푡∗퐵Π퐵 + 푇
∗
퐵 = Π퐵 − Π퐴 solves this problem. Due to Assumption 4, country 퐵 sets a
positive lump-sum tax 푇 ∗퐵 > 0 if and only if 휏
∗
퐵 = 0; otherwise, for any 휏
∗
퐵 > 0, it
pays a lump-sum subsidy 푇 ∗퐵 < 0; in particular, 휏
∗
퐵 ∈ [0, 1] and 푇 ∗퐵 ∈ [−Π퐴,Π퐵 −Π퐴].
Therefore, country 퐵 always wins the competition for FDI by fully extracting the foreign
12The same equilibrium outcome arises if we assume Bertrand price competition between countries.
We provide a more general and formal deﬁnition of the equilibrium of the policy-competition-for-FDI
game in the Appendix.
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ﬁrm’s location gain from investing there, Π퐵 −Π퐴 > 0. As before, it is trivial to verify
that perfect tax discrimination maximizes aggregate welfare.
Under tax discrimination or tax competition, the two governments just choose the
rate 휏푖 at which the multinational ﬁrm’s declared proﬁts are taxed. In this case, country
퐴’s best oﬀer is represented by a zero tax rate, i.e., 휏퐴 = 0, and the problem of country
퐵’s government simpliﬁes to
max
휏퐵
휏퐵휋퐵
s.t. (1− 휏퐵) Π퐵 ≥ Π퐴
For the same reason as before, the solution comes from the constraint holding with
equality, which gives 휏∗퐵 = 1 − Π퐴Π퐵 ∈ [0, 1]. Once again, country 퐵 always wins the
competition for FDI and aggregate welfare is maximized.
But what happens to regional welfare? Does policy competition for FDI allows the
region as a whole and its residents to enjoy more resources?
In the ﬁrst instance, we argue that whenever policy competition does not change the
investment decision of the foreign multinational, regional welfare is always lower than
in the no policy competition scenario. In fact, we want to focus on situations where
both countries could potentially receive FDI, hence they really have to compete against
each other to aﬀect the ﬁrm’s choice. Under no policy competition, if the multinational
chooses to invest in country 퐵, regional welfare is given by 푊푅퐵,푁표 = 푡퐵Π퐵. Under
subsidy competition, country 퐵 always succeeds in attracting FDI but regional welfare
decreases to 푊푅퐵,푆푢푏 = 푡퐵Π퐵 − 푆∗퐵 = Π퐵 − Π퐴 < 푊푅퐵,푁표 since 푆∗퐵 > 0 by Assumption
4. Similarly, under either kind of tax competition, regional welfare is equivalent to the
subsidy competition scenario, thus lower than without competition. In this case, country
퐵 might be able to fully extract the foreign ﬁrm’s gain from locating there, but it has
to forgive the opportunity of taxing the ﬁrm’s proﬁts by lowering its corporate tax rate
to zero.
Absent policy competition and proﬁt shifting, however, the ﬁrm might choose to
invest in the ﬁscally-advantageous country 퐴 in order to save on tax payments. If this
were the case, any form of policy competition may increase regional welfare by making
the multinational invest in the location-advantageous country 퐵, and so we can state
Proposition 1 When the diﬀerence in statutory corporate tax rates within the region
is suﬃciently large, the region as a whole beneﬁts from any kind of policy competition
for FDI between countries.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The main message of this Section is that, in the absence of proﬁt shifting, large
diﬀerentials in statutory corporate tax rates between the two countries may drive the
FDI decision of the multinational ﬁrm in a way which does not maximize welfare for
the region as a whole. In this case, allowing countries to compete for FDI may increase
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regional welfare since policy competition makes the ﬁrm invest in the most proﬁtable
(before-taxes) location. In the next Section, we investigate whether the regional-welfare-
improving impact of policy competition for FDI and the equivalence between the diﬀer-
ent ﬁscal policies we analyze are robust to proﬁt shifting by the multinational ﬁrm in
response to tax rate diﬀerentials.
4 Proﬁt shifting
We now investigate the most interesting set-up where the foreign multinational is able to
shift, at some cost, taxable proﬁts to low-tax jurisdictions in response to cross-country
tax diﬀerentials. To this end, we solve by backward induction the three-stage game
described at the beginning of Section 2 to ﬁnd its subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
4.1 Stage 3: proﬁt declaration
At the last stage of the game, the foreign multinational chooses the amount of proﬁts
to declare to the tax authorities of the countries where it operates, that is either 퐴 or
퐵 and 퐹 . When taking such a decision, the ﬁrm can observe statutory corporate tax
rates in country 푖 (푖 = 퐴,퐵) and country 퐹 as well as the ﬁscal incentives oﬀered by
countries 퐴 and 퐵 if policy competition occurs, and it anticipates the level of before-tax
proﬁts it can realize by locating in either country. The ﬁrm then chooses the amount
of proﬁts to declare to country 푖’s tax authorities, 휋푖, in order to maximize its after-tax
proﬁts. This, in turn, determines the level of declared proﬁts in country 퐹 , 휋퐹 .
Using (1) and optimizing with respect to 휋푖, we obtain
휋푖 = Π푖 − 푡푖 − 푡퐹
훾
and 휋퐹 = Π퐹 +
푡푖 − 푡퐹
훾
(5)
from which it follows that no proﬁt misdeclaration takes place when countries 푖 and 퐹 tax
corporate proﬁts at the same rate. However, for any 푡푖 ∕= 푡퐹 , the multinational always
declares higher proﬁts than those actually realized in the lower-tax country and lower
proﬁts in the higher-tax country. Note also that any kind of lump-sum subsidies/taxes
set by countries 퐴 and 퐵 does not aﬀect the multinational ﬁrm’s proﬁt declaration
choice.
Since we do not want the ﬁrm to declare negative proﬁts in the high-tax country,
which would otherwise subsidize it at the prevailing corporate tax rate, we need to
assume that proﬁt shifting is costly enough, i.e.
훾 >
∣푡푖 − 푡퐹 ∣
min {Π푖,Π퐹 } , 푖 = 퐴,퐵 (6)
as we are not making any speciﬁc hypothesis about the relationship between Π푖 and
Π퐹 . This guarantees that the multinational ﬁrm shifts part of its realized proﬁts from
the high-tax to the low-tax country and at the same time declares nonnegative proﬁts
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in both of the countries where it operates. In what follows, we call (6) the non-negative-
proﬁt-declaration condition.
4.2 Stage 2: FDI decision
At the second stage, the foreign multinational chooses whether to establish its production
plant in country 퐴 or in country 퐵, and, depending on its investment decision, realizes
proﬁts (Π퐴 or Π퐵) by serving the regional market. At this stage of the game, the ﬁrm
takes the ﬁscal policies of the two countries as given and invests in the country where it
earns larger after-tax proﬁts.
Using the ﬁrm’s objective function (1), where we substitute for stage-3 optimal
declared proﬁts (5), and rearranging terms, the multinational’s after-tax proﬁts from
investing in country 푖 and shifting proﬁts out of (or into) country 퐹 under the policy
competition scenario 푘 ∈ {푁표, 푆푢푏, 푇푎푥,퐷푖푠푐} can be rewritten as13
Π푖,푘 = (1− 푡푖) Π푖 + (1− 푡퐹 ) Π퐹 + 푆푖 + (푡푖 − 푡퐹 )
2
2훾
, 푖 = 퐴,퐵 (7)
where the last term represents the net gain to shift taxable proﬁts from the high-tax to
the low-tax country in response to any tax diﬀerential between them.
If countries 퐴 and 퐵 do not compete to attract FDI (푆푖 = 0, 푖 = 퐴,퐵), the foreign
multinational invests in country 퐵 as long as the following condition holds:
(1− 푡퐵) Π퐵 +
(푡퐵 − 푡퐴)
(
푡− 푡퐹
)
훾︸ ︷︷ ︸
relative PS gain/loss
> (1− 푡퐴) Π퐴 (8)
where 푡 ≡ 푡퐴+푡퐵2 is the average statutory corporate tax rate in the region and 푃푆 is
an acronym for proﬁt shifting. A comparison of (8) with the corresponding condition
in the absence of proﬁt shifting, i.e., condition (4), suggests that, for a given 푡퐵 > 푡퐴,
proﬁt shifting opportunities may turn the ﬁscally-disadvantageous country 퐵 into a
relatively more attractive location for the foreign ﬁrm’s investment. In particular, when
the average tax rate prevailing in the region is higher than the residence country’s tax
rate
(
푡 > 푡퐹
)
, the multinational ﬁnds it relatively more interesting to invest in the higher-
tax country as proﬁt shifting partially oﬀsets country 퐵’s ﬁscal disadvantage. Otherwise,
when 푡 < 푡퐹 , proﬁt shifting opportunities work in favor of the lower-tax country. Stated
diﬀerently, if proﬁt shifting goes out of (into) the region, the country setting the higher
(the lower) corporate tax rate becomes, ceteris paribus, more attractive. In spite of
that, in the presence of proﬁt shifting, larger tax diﬀerentials always make the ﬁscally-
advantageous country 퐴 more proﬁtable from the foreign ﬁrm’s perspective as the gain
from shifting proﬁts out of the high-tax country cannot compensate for the cost of
13The terms No, Sub, Tax, and Disc, stand for no policy competition, subsidy competition, perfect
tax discrimination, and tax discrimination, respectively.
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paying taxes there. Then, condition (8) is less likely to hold. This can be easily seen
by diﬀerentiating (8) with respect to 푡퐴 or 푡퐵 and recalling the non-negative-proﬁt-
declaration condition (6).
Under subsidy competition (for given statutory corporate tax rates), countries 퐴 and
퐵 oﬀer lump-sum subsidies that aﬀect the relative proﬁtability of the two alternative
locations. In particular, when each country bids its maximum subsidy, 푆푚푎푥푖 (푖 = 퐴,퐵),
the foreign multinational invests in country 퐵 if and only if
(1− 푡퐵) Π퐵 +
(푡퐵 − 푡퐴)
(
푡− 푡퐹
)
훾
+ 푆푚푎푥퐵 > (1− 푡퐴) Π퐴 + 푆푚푎푥퐴 (9)
Under perfect tax discrimination, countries 퐴 and 퐵 are endowed with two ﬁscal
policy instruments and compete over both tax rates, 휏푖, and lump-sum taxes, 푇푖 (푖 =
퐴,퐵). Then, the multinational ﬁrm chooses to invest in country 퐵 if and only if
(1− 휏퐵) Π퐵 + (휏퐵 − 휏퐴) (휏 − 푡퐹 )
훾
− 푇퐵 > (1− 휏퐴) Π퐴 − 푇퐴 (10)
where 휏 ≡ 휏퐴+휏퐵2 is the average ad hoc corporate tax rate of the two countries and the
ﬁscal package (휏푖, 푇푖) represents country 푖’s oﬀer to the foreign investor.
Finally, under tax discrimination, countries 퐴 and 퐵 compete just over tax rates, 휏푖,
and the foreign multinational invests in country 퐵 as long as
(1− 휏퐵) Π퐵 + (휏퐵 − 휏퐴) (휏 − 푡퐹 )
훾
> (1− 휏퐴) Π퐴 (11)
where the tax rate 휏푖 results from the welfare maximization problem of country 푖, which
we analyze - together with subsidy competition and perfect tax discrimination - in the
next subsection.
4.3 Stage 1: policy competition for FDI
At the ﬁrst stage, the governments of countries 퐴 and 퐵 simultaneously and irreversibly
post bids to attract the foreign investor. The objective of each country’s government is
to maximize the national welfare gain from receiving FDI.
As we claimed before, we investigate four alternative policy-competition-for-FDI sce-
narios. Under no policy competition, the two countries do not oﬀer any tax incentive
to the foreign multinational. Hence, the ﬁrm takes its investment decision according to
condition (8) and regional welfare and the ﬁrm’s after-tax proﬁts are given, respectively,
by 푊푅퐴,푁표 = 푡퐴휋퐴 and Π
퐴,푁표 = (1− 푡퐴) Π퐴+(1− 푡퐹 ) Π퐹 + (푡퐹−푡퐴)
2
2훾 if FDI goes to coun-
try 퐴, or 푊푅퐵,푁표 = 푡퐵휋퐵 and Π
퐵,푁표 = (1− 푡퐵) Π퐵 + (1− 푡퐹 ) Π퐹 + (푡퐹−푡퐵)
2
2훾 otherwise,
where 휋퐴 and 휋퐵 are the ﬁrm’s optimal declared proﬁts in (5). In the other scenarios, we
let the two countries compete for FDI either by oﬀering to the multinational lump-sum
subsidies (for given statutory tax rates), or by choosing both the corporate tax rate and
a lump-sum tax on the ﬁrm’s proﬁts, or simply the ad hoc corporate tax rate.
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Under subsidy competition, the maximum subsidy country 푖 is willing and able to
oﬀer is represented by a full reimbursement of the taxes paid on the proﬁts declared by
the ﬁrm to country 푖’s tax authorities, that is, 푆푚푎푥푖 = 푡푖휋푖 (푖 = 퐴,퐵). Namely, since
proﬁt shifting allows the ﬁrm to misdeclare realized proﬁts at each location in response
to tax rate diﬀerentials, the maximum subsidies bid by countries 퐴 and 퐵 are given by
푆푚푎푥퐴 = 푡퐴
(
Π퐴 − 푡퐴 − 푡퐹
훾
)
and 푆푚푎푥퐵 = 푡퐵
(
Π퐵 − 푡퐵 − 푡퐹
훾
)
(12)
where we replace 휋푖 with stage-3 optimal declared proﬁts (5). We know from condition
(9) that the foreign ﬁrm invests in the country representing the most proﬁtable (subsidy
inclusive) location. Substituting for the two countries’ maximum subsidies (12) and
rearranging terms, this condition reduces to
Π퐵 −Π퐴 > (푡퐵 − 푡퐴) 푡
훾
(13)
which suggests that subsidy competition induces the multinational to invest in country
퐵 as long as proﬁt shifting motivations are less important for the ﬁrm than the location
advantage of setting up a production plant there. In the presence of proﬁt shifting,
indeed, subsidy competition cannot oﬀset country 퐵’s ﬁscal disadvantage relative to 퐴.
When condition (13) holds, country 퐵 wins the competition for FDI. In equilibrium,
however, it does not need to pay its maximum subsidy but just the one which is necessary
to outbid its competitor. Hence, the equilibrium subsidy country 퐵 pays to attract FDI
in the presence of proﬁt shifting opportunities for the ﬁrm amounts to
푆˜∗퐵 = 푆
∗
퐵 +
2푡퐵푡퐹 − 푡2퐵 − 푡2퐴
2훾
where 푆∗퐵 is country 퐵’s equilibrium subsidy in the absence of proﬁt shifting. Thus,
depending on statutory corporate tax rates, 푆˜∗퐵 can be either higher or lower than 푆
∗
퐵.
In particular, if the multinational is interested in shifting taxable proﬁts into the region
(푡퐹 > 푡퐴, 푡퐵) or simply to the lower-tax country (푡퐵 > 푡퐹 > 푡퐴), the subsidy country
퐵 has to pay to attract the foreign investor is higher than without proﬁt shifting, i.e.
푆˜∗퐵 > 푆
∗
퐵. Otherwise, for 푡퐴, 푡퐵 > 푡퐹 , the multinational ﬁnds it relatively more proﬁtable
to invest in the higher-tax country as it can now shift taxable proﬁts out of the region,
which leads to 푆˜∗퐵 < 푆
∗
퐵.
The discussion above allows us to conclude that, in the presence of proﬁt shifting,
both countries can win subsidy competition for FDI. If country 퐵 attracts the foreign
investor, regional welfare is equal to
푊푅퐵,푆푢푏 = 푡퐵휋퐵 − 푆˜∗퐵 = Π퐵 −Π퐴 −
(푡퐵 − 푡퐴) 푡
훾
and, substituting for 푆˜∗퐵 into equation (7), the multinational’s after-tax proﬁts from
investing in country 퐵 and shifting proﬁts out of (or into) country 퐹 are given by
Π퐵,푆푢푏 = Π퐴 + (1− 푡퐹 ) Π퐹 + 푡
2
퐹 − 푡2퐴
2훾
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On the other hand, if it is country 퐴 that receives FDI, regional welfare is given by
푊푅퐴,푆푢푏 = 푡퐴휋퐴 − 푆˜∗퐴 =
(푡퐵 − 푡퐴) 푡
훾
− (Π퐵 −Π퐴) = −푊푅퐵,푆푢푏
where 푆˜∗퐴 = Π퐵− (1− 푡퐴) Π퐴+ 2푡퐴푡퐹−푡
2
퐵−푡2퐴
2훾 is derived in the same way as 푆˜
∗
퐵. It is then
immediate to compute the multinational’s after-tax proﬁts from investing in country 퐴
and shifting proﬁts out of (or into) country 퐹 by replacing 푆˜∗퐴 into equation (7).
The following Proposition summarizes our ﬁndings about subsidy competition for
FDI in the presence of proﬁt shifting:
Proposition 2 In the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the subsidy-competition-for-
FDI game
∙ if country 퐵’s location advantage is more important for the foreign ﬁrm than proﬁt
shifting opportunities, i.e., condition (13) holds:
– country 퐵 wins the competition for FDI and pays a subsidy 푆˜∗퐵;
– the foreign ﬁrm invests in 퐵 and declares proﬁts 휋퐵 = Π퐵 − 푡퐵−푡퐹훾 and
휋퐹 = Π퐹 +
푡퐵−푡퐹
훾 ;
– the payoﬀs to country 퐵 (hence, to the region), to country 퐴, and to the
foreign ﬁrm are given by 푊퐵퐵 = 푊
푅
퐵,푆푢푏 = Π퐵 −Π퐴− (푡퐵−푡퐴)푡훾 , 푊퐴퐵 = 0, and
Π퐵,푆푢푏 = Π퐴 + (1− 푡퐹 ) Π퐹 + 푡
2
퐹−푡2퐴
2훾 , respectively;
∙ if proﬁt shifting opportunities are more important for the foreign ﬁrm than country
퐵’s location advantage, i.e., condition (13) does not hold:
– country 퐴 wins the competition for FDI and pays a subsidy 푆˜∗퐴;
– the foreign ﬁrm invests in 퐴 and declares proﬁts 휋퐴 = Π퐴 − 푡퐴−푡퐹훾 and
휋퐹 = Π퐹 +
푡퐴−푡퐹
훾 ;
– the payoﬀs to country 퐵, to country 퐴 (hence, to the region), and to the
foreign ﬁrm are given by 푊퐵퐴 = 0, 푊
퐴
퐴 = 푊
푅
퐴,푆푢푏 =
(푡퐵−푡퐴)푡
훾 − (Π퐵 −Π퐴),
and Π퐴,푆푢푏 = Π퐵 + (1− 푡퐹 ) Π퐹 + 푡
2
퐹−푡2퐵
2훾 , respectively.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Under perfect tax discrimination, the two countries choose both the corporate tax
rate and a lump-sum tax on the foreign ﬁrm’s proﬁts. In particular, when we allow for
proﬁt shifting opportunities, the problem of country 퐵’s government can be written as
follows:
max
휏퐵 ,푇퐵
휏퐵휋퐵 + 푇퐵
s.t. (1− 휏퐵) Π퐵 − 푡퐵 (2푡퐹 − 푡퐵)
2훾
− 푇퐵 ≥ Π퐴
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where 휋퐵 = Π퐵− 휏퐵−푡퐹훾 from the ﬁrm’s optimal declared proﬁts in (5) and the constraint
comes from condition (10) with 휏퐴 = 푇퐴 = 0 as country 퐵’s oﬀer has to outbid country
퐴’s best oﬀer to the foreign ﬁrm. We easily show that the tax pair
(휏∗퐵, 푇
∗
퐵) = (0,Π퐵 −Π퐴)
solves this problem. Hence, country 퐵 always wins the competition for FDI by levying a
zero tax rate on declared proﬁts and by fully extracting the foreign ﬁrm’s location gain
from investing there by means of a positive lump-sum tax. As a result, regional welfare
is given by 푊푅퐵,푇푎푥 = 푊
퐵
퐵 = Π퐵 −Π퐴. This allows us to state
Proposition 3 In the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the game where countries
compete in non-linear-taxes
∙ country 퐵 always wins the competition for FDI by setting (휏∗퐵, 푇 ∗퐵) = (0,Π퐵 −Π퐴);
∙ the foreign ﬁrm always invests in 퐵 and declares proﬁts 휋퐵 = Π퐵 + 푡퐹훾 and 휋퐹 =
Π퐹 − 푡퐹훾 ;
∙ the payoﬀs to country 퐵 (hence, to the region), to country 퐴, and to the foreign
ﬁrm are given by 푊퐵퐵 = 푊
푅
퐵,푇푎푥 = Π퐵 − Π퐴, 푊퐴퐵 = 0, and Π퐵,푇푎푥 = Π퐴 +
(1− 푡퐹 ) Π퐹 + 푡
2
퐹
2훾 , respectively.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The intuition for such a result is simple. When the two countries’ governments are
allowed to oﬀer fully ﬂexible tax packages to the foreign investor, the distortions intro-
duced by statutory corporate tax rate diﬀerentials and by the proﬁt shifting behavior of
the multinational ﬁrm can be eliminated. Then, the country where the ﬁrm may enjoy
the largest (before-tax) proﬁts always wins the competition for FDI.14 In equilibrium,
the maximum proﬁt shifting opportunities for the multinational ﬁrm arise when 휏퐵 = 0
- that is, when country 퐵 oﬀers a tax holiday to the ﬁrm - and the lump-sum tax allows
country 퐵 itself to extract all the relative location rents from investing there.
Under tax discrimination (or tax competition), the two governments do not have the
non-distortionary lump-sum tax at their disposal and just compete over the rate 휏푖 at
which the multinational ﬁrm’s declared proﬁts are taxed. In this case, the problem of
country 퐵’s government is given by
max
휏퐵
휏퐵휋퐵
s.t. (1− 휏퐵) Π퐵 + (휏퐵 − 휏퐴) (휏 − 푡퐹 )
훾
≥ (1− 휏퐴) Π퐴
14This reminds us the well-known result in the IO literature on vertical product diﬀerentiation ac-
cording to which if a high and a low quality good are oﬀered at the same price, then all consumers will
buy the high quality good (see, e.g., Pepall et al., 2008). Here, absent tax distortions, country 퐵 will
beneﬁt from a higher intrinsic quality relative to country 퐴 because of its location advantage.
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where 휋퐵 = Π퐵 − 휏퐵−푡퐹훾 from (5). In the Appendix, we show that the solution to this
problem 휏∗퐵 (휏퐴), given country 퐴’s best oﬀer to the foreign ﬁrm, 휏퐴 = 0, is
휏∗퐵 (0) ≡ 휏ˆ퐵 = 훾Π퐵 + 푡퐹 −
√
(훾Π퐵 + 푡퐹 )
2 − 2훾 (Π퐵 −Π퐴)
which is always positive and smaller than 1 for any 훾 > 1−2푡퐹2Π퐴 .
15 Note also that, under
the last condition, 휏ˆ퐵 is always increasing in Π퐵, which suggests that the larger the
before-tax proﬁtability from investing in 퐵 (due to, e.g., a larger market size relative to
퐴), the lower the incentive to tax discriminate in favor of foreign ﬁrms, i.e., the higher
the tax rate that country 퐵 bids to attract the foreign investor.
Hence, in equilibrium, country 퐵 always wins the competition for FDI by setting a
positive tax rate on the foreign ﬁrm’s declared proﬁts. Regional welfare is then given by
푊푅퐵,퐷푖푠푐 = 푊
퐵
퐵 = Π퐵 −Π퐴 − 휏ˆ
2
퐵
2훾 and it represents the marginal contribution of country
퐵 to aggregate welfare (or total surplus), deﬁned as the unweighted sum of regional
welfare and the ﬁrm’s after-tax proﬁts.16 In fact, such a contribution corresponds to the
location advantage of 퐵 over 퐴, Π퐵 − Π퐴, minus the loss in terms of overall potential
gains from proﬁt shifting, that is,
[
푡퐹
푡퐹−휏ˆ퐵
훾 − (푡퐹−휏ˆ퐵)
2
2훾
]
−
[
푡퐹
푡퐹
훾 −
푡2퐹
2훾
]
= − 휏ˆ2퐵2훾 .
We summarize our results about tax discrimination in
Proposition 4 In the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the tax-competition-for-FDI
game
∙ country 퐵 always wins the competition for FDI by setting 휏ˆ퐵 ∈ (0, 1);
∙ the foreign ﬁrm always invests in 퐵 and declares proﬁts 휋퐵 = Π퐵 − 휏ˆ퐵−푡퐹훾 and
휋퐹 = Π퐹 +
휏ˆ퐵−푡퐹
훾 ;
∙ the payoﬀs to country 퐵 (hence, to the region), to country 퐴, and to the foreign
ﬁrm are given by 푊퐵퐵 = 푊
푅
퐵,퐷푖푠푐 = Π퐵 − Π퐴 − 휏ˆ
2
퐵
2훾 , 푊
퐴
퐵 = 0, and Π
퐵,퐷푖푠푐 =
(1− 휏ˆ퐵) Π퐵 + (1− 푡퐹 ) Π퐹 + (휏ˆ퐵−푡퐹 )
2
2훾 , respectively.
Proof. See the Appendix.
4.4 Welfare implications
In this Section, we evaluate the welfare impact of proﬁt shifting by the foreign multina-
tional investing in the region. We analyze ﬁrst the implications for aggregate welfare and
15We cannot say a priori whether this condition is more or less stringent than the non-negative-proﬁt-
declaration condition (6). In any case, we assume that the most stringent of the two holds.
16Our results can be easily interpreted in the light of the common agency literature since our model
considers two principals (the two governments) that submit oﬀers to a common agent (the foreign
investor). In particular, Chiesa and Denicolo` (2009) show that in a common agency game with two prin-
cipals and complete information, each principal’s payoﬀ corresponds exactly to its marginal contribution
to social surplus even when we relax the assumption of truthful strategies.
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then investigate whether the introduction of policy competition may enhance regional
welfare by changing the foreign ﬁrm’s investment decision. Finally, we show under which
conditions tax discrimination has to be preferred to subsidy competition.
It is easy to check that, even in the presence of proﬁt shifting, any of the three forms
of policy competition for FDI maximizes aggregate welfare. Namely, it always induces
the multinational ﬁrm to take the investment decision which yields higher welfare for
the economy as a whole. For example, under subsidy competition, aggregate welfare is
maximized when FDI goes to 퐵 as long as
푊푅퐵,푆푢푏 + Π
퐵,푆푢푏 > 푊푅퐴,푆푢푏 + Π
퐴,푆푢푏 ⇐⇒ Π퐵 −Π퐴 > (푡퐵 − 푡퐴) 푡
훾
which is equivalent to condition (13), that drives the ﬁrm’s FDI choice. Under perfect
tax discrimination, instead, we have that
푊푅퐵,푇푎푥 + Π
퐵,푇푎푥 > 푊푅퐴,푇푎푥 + Π
퐴,푇푎푥 ⇐⇒ Π퐵 > Π퐴
as this form of competition eliminates the distortions introduced by corporate taxation
and proﬁt shifting opportunities and leads the ﬁrm to invest in the country where it
beneﬁts from a location advantage.
Both subsidy competition for FDI and the two forms of tax discrimination maximize
aggregate welfare. However, they are no longer equivalent in the presence of proﬁt
shifting. When countries compete over non-linear taxes, both of them oﬀer a tax holiday
to the foreign ﬁrm. The latter takes into account the possibility of not paying taxes at all
on the proﬁts it declares in the country where it sets up its production plant. Hence, it
optimally shifts into the host country as much of its proﬁts as it can since the corporate
tax rate it has to face there is nil. As the potential proﬁt shifting gain is the same
in both countries, the one which beneﬁts from a location advantage, i.e., country 퐵,
always receives FDI. Moreover, it can extract the ﬁrm’s proﬁt gain from investing there
by means of the lump-sum tax. Under tax discrimination, country 퐵 is still able to
set a tax rate which induces the foreign ﬁrm to invest there but it cannot fully enjoy
the location rent because of the loss in terms of proﬁt shifting. By contrast, lump-sum
subsidy competition does not aﬀect proﬁt declaration and proﬁt shifting motivations
play a decisive role for the FDI choice.
To investigate the eﬀects on regional welfare of policy competition for FDI in the
presence of proﬁt shifting, we assume that either form of competition always decreases
regional welfare when it does not change the multinational ﬁrm’s investment decision:
Assumption 5 푊푅푖,푘 < 푊
푅
푖,푁표, 푘 ∈ {푆푢푏, 푇푎푥,퐷푖푠푐}
This allows us to exclude from the analysis the cases where policy competition resolves
into a new tax instrument for the host country and to focus on situations where com-
petition for FDI actually takes place as both countries represent proﬁtable locations
(either before or after taxes) for the ﬁrm. Assumption 5 thus implies that under subsidy
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competition, both countries have to pay positive equilibrium subsidies to attract FDI; or
under either form of tax discrimination, the cost for country 퐵 of lowering the corporate
tax rate on the foreign ﬁrm’s proﬁts (either to zero or to some positive value) cannot
compensate for the gain from (full or partial) rent extraction.
Due to our initial Assumptions 1 and 2 and based on our results of Section 4.3,
Assumption 5 allows us to rank regional welfare from FDI to country 퐵 as follows:
푊푅퐵,푁표 > 푊
푅
퐵,푇푎푥 > 푊
푅
퐵,푆푢푏 and 푊
푅
퐵,푁표 > 푊
푅
퐵,푇푎푥 > 푊
푅
퐵,퐷푖푠푐
meaning that no competition has to be always preferred to any form of policy compe-
tition for FDI; if competition takes place, however, perfect tax discrimination always
yields higher regional welfare than subsidy competition or tax discrimination.
Concerning regional welfare from FDI to country 퐴, we have that
푊푅퐴,푁표 > 푊
푅
퐴,푆푢푏
as neither form of tax discrimination can induce the ﬁrm to invest there. Note also that
∂푊푅퐴,푁표
∂푡퐴
> 0 if and only if 훾 > 2푡퐴−푡퐹Π퐴 .
17 Since 푡퐵 > 푡퐴 by Assumption 2, a lower 푡퐴,
for a given 푡퐵, increases the tax diﬀerence between them and, if 훾 is high enough, i.e,
if proﬁt shifting is suﬃciently costly, it decreases regional welfare from FDI to 퐴 under
no policy competition.
We want to show that policy competition may increase regional welfare by changing
the ﬁrm’s FDI decision. In particular, as perfect tax discrimination always leads to
higher regional welfare than the other two forms of policy competition, we focus on the
comparison between 푊푅퐵,푆푢푏 and 푊
푅
퐴,푁표. The latter is the best situation for the region
as a whole when FDI goes to 퐴, and, for this to happen, the multinational has to ﬁnd
it proﬁtable to invest in country 퐴 in the absence of policy competition, i.e., Π퐴,푁표 >
Π퐵,푁표 must hold. It is also easy to check that the welfare of country 퐵 - hence, of the
region - corresponds to the marginal contribution of country 퐵 to aggregate welfare,
and it can thus be deﬁned as the diﬀerence between aggregate welfare when the ﬁrm
invests in 퐵 and when it invests in 퐴, i.e., 푊푅퐵,푆푢푏 = 푊
푅
퐵,푁표+Π
퐵,푁표−
(
푊푅퐴,푁표 + Π
퐴,푁표
)
.
Therefore, provided that Π퐴,푁표 > Π퐵,푁표, regional welfare increases as a result of subsidy
competition as long as
푊푅퐵,푁표 > Π
퐴,푁표 −Π퐵,푁표 + 2푊푅퐴,푁표
which is more likely to be true when the relative after-tax proﬁtability from investing in
퐴 over 퐵 essentially depends on a low statutory corporate tax rate 푡퐴 or on an important
diﬀerence between 푡퐴 and 푡퐵. Indeed, a lower 푡퐴 increases Π
퐴,푁표 but, if proﬁt shifting
17If 푡퐹 < 푡퐴, the ﬁrm shifts taxable proﬁts to country 퐹 and 푊
푅
퐴,푁표 increases with 푡퐴 if and only if 훾
is high enough, meaning that proﬁt shifting is limited by its cost. If 푡퐹 > 2푡퐴, 푊
푅
퐴,푁표 always increases
with 푡퐴 since 푡퐹 is so high that 훾 becomes negligible. Finally, if 푡퐹 ∈ (푡퐴, 2푡퐴), the ﬁrm shifts taxable
proﬁts to country 퐴, which can increase its tax revenue by increasing 푡퐴 as long as 훾 is high enough.
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is costly enough, it simultaneously reduces tax revenues (hence, regional welfare from
FDI to 퐴). This allows us to claim
Proposition 5 In the presence of proﬁt shifting, subsidy competition for FDI may be
beneﬁcial to the region if the diﬀerence in statutory corporate tax rates within the region
is large enough.
In fact, for a suﬃciently large statutory tax rate diﬀerence, we know that the multi-
national ﬁrm prefers to invest in the ﬁscally-advantageous country 퐴 absent policy
competition. But as we let this diﬀerence increase further - by decreasing 푡퐴, for a
given 푡퐵 - regional welfare from FDI to 퐴 may decrease. Hence, subsidy competition
may be regional-welfare improving since it induces the ﬁrm to invest in the location-
advantageous country 퐵. This is true provided that proﬁt shifting is so costly that a
reduction in 푡퐴 does not allow country 퐴 to increase the revenue it can collect by taxing
the multinational ﬁrm’s proﬁts.
Lastly, we want to demonstrate that, in the presence of proﬁt shifting, tax discrim-
ination might be more desirable than subsidy competition as a policy instrument to
attract FDI. To this end, we need to compare 푊푅퐵,퐷푖푠푐 and 푊
푅
퐵,푆푢푏, notably the impact
of proﬁt shifting under the two policies, which would otherwise be equivalent. It is then
straightforward to show that
푊푅퐵,퐷푖푠푐 > 푊
푅
퐵,푆푢푏 ⇐⇒ 휏ˆ퐵 ∈
(
0,
√
(푡퐴 − 푡퐵) (푡퐴 + 푡퐵)
)
since 휏ˆ퐵 cannot be negative. Such a condition is more likely to hold the higher the
statutory corporate tax rate diﬀerence or the sum (i.e., the average) of tax rates or both
are. We can thus state
Proposition 6 In the presence of proﬁt shifting, tax discrimination is more likely to
yield higher regional welfare than subsidy competition for FDI when the diﬀerence in
statutory corporate tax rates within the region and/or the average statutory corporate
tax rate prevailing in the region are large enough.
To understand why this is so, we just need to look at regional welfare from FDI to
country 퐵 under subsidy competition, 푊푅퐵,푆푢푏 = Π퐵 − Π퐴 − (푡퐵−푡퐴)푡훾 , since regional
welfare under tax discrimination, 푊푅퐵,퐷푖푠푐, does not depend on the statutory corporate
tax rates 푡퐴 and 푡퐵. We know that 푊
푅
퐵,푆푢푏 represents country 퐵’s marginal contribution
to aggregate welfare, where the latter is deﬁned as the sum of regional welfare and the
ﬁrm’s after-tax proﬁts, thereby excluding country 퐹 . For a given average statutory
tax rate in the region 푡, a larger diﬀerence (푡퐵 − 푡퐴) decreases country 퐵’s marginal
contribution since the amount of taxable proﬁts the multinational ﬁrm shifts into the
region shrinks (or, similarly, proﬁt shifting to the residence country 퐹 gets larger). On
the other hand, for a given statutory tax rate diﬀerence within the region (푡퐵 − 푡퐴), a
higher average tax rate 푡 lowers country 퐵’s marginal contribution because a symmetric
increase in statutory tax rates - that keeps the diﬀerence between them constant - has a
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negative eﬀect on aggregate welfare and such an eﬀect is stronger for the country with
the higher statutory tax rate.
5 Concluding remarks
The phenomenon of competition for FDI is pervasive and mostly takes place between
countries belonging to the same geographic or economic area. The incentives oﬀered
to foreign investors often consist in tax holidays or other kinds of speciﬁc tax con-
cessions. Moreover, the empirical evidence seems to suggest that multinational ﬁrms
might consider proﬁt shifting opportunities when deciding the location of their foreign
subsidiaries. In order to counter what policymakers label “harmful” tax competition
between governments, both the European Union and the OECD recommend member
countries not to discriminate between taxation of purely domestic and of multinational
ﬁrms. In such a sense, one of the major attempts worldwide to limit policy competition
for FDI is represented by State Aid Control in the European Union. This system should
prevent countries from oﬀering subsidies in order to attract foreign investors. But there
is empirical evidence to the contrary.
The objective of this paper has been to investigate the impact on regional welfare
of policy competition for FDI when a foreign multinational can strategically react to
diﬀerences in statutory corporate tax rates and shift taxable proﬁts to lower-tax juris-
dictions. In particular, we have tried to understand whether it can be welfare-improving
for the region as a whole that countries compete against each other by oﬀering further
tax incentives when their national corporate tax systems already give the multinational
some opportunities to minimize its worldwide tax liabilities. To this end, we have set
up a model of policy competition for FDI between two countries belonging to the same
region, and we have assumed that one country has a location advantage but a ﬁscal
disadvantage relative to the other one.
If we rule out proﬁt shifting opportunities, any form of policy competition elim-
inates tax distortions and induces the foreign multinational to invest in the location-
advantageous country. Moreover, when the statutory tax rate diﬀerence is large enough,
policy competition increases regional welfare by changing the investment decision of the
ﬁrm. On the other hand, when we take proﬁt shifting opportunities into account, sub-
sidy competition can no longer oﬀset tax distortions. Then, proﬁt shifting motivations
may induce the ﬁrm to invest in the ﬁscally-advantageous country. By contrast, either
form of tax discrimination cancels out the distortions arising from statutory tax rate
diﬀerentials and induces the foreign ﬁrm to choose the most eﬃcient location for its in-
vestment. In spite of that, subsidy competition may still be regional-welfare-improving
when the statutory tax rate diﬀerence is large enough.
Our main contribution has been to prove that, in the presence of proﬁt shifting, tax
discrimination might be preferable - in terms of regional welfare - to subsidy compe-
tition as a policy instrument to attract FDI. This is more likely to be true when the
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statutory tax rate diﬀerence within the region and/or the average tax rate prevailing
in the region are high. Such a result has important policy implications for, e.g., the
European Union. Indeed, it challenges the propriety of the non-discrimination principle
in an area characterized by both high tax levels and high tax diﬀerentials. In this con-
text, tax discrimination, i.e., a policy which is more able to adjust to the proﬁt shifting
activities of multinational ﬁrms, might lead to larger beneﬁts than lump-sum subsidy
competition.
We conclude with two remarks on our modeling choices. First, we restrict attention
to tax instruments to attract FDI. This is because we want to focus on policies that
aﬀect proﬁt declaration by the multinational ﬁrm, hence its proﬁt shifting ability in
response to the ﬁscal incentives oﬀered by competing countries. To this end, we do
not let governments choose, e.g., the level of public infrastructure (roads, bridges, rail
connections, airports, etc.) supplied to the ﬁrm. This, however, might be captured by
the exogenous diﬀerence in before-tax proﬁtability between the two locations as long as
we consider infrastructure as a local public good, whose beneﬁts can be enjoyed by the
ﬁrm only by locating in the country where the investment has been made.18
Second, our set-up is characterized by complete information, i.e., the economic agents
(the governments and the multinational ﬁrm) know everything they need to know to
take the decisions which maximize their payoﬀs. But there are several ways to introduce
asymmetric information in our framework.19 For instance, by assuming that the foreign
multinational possesses private information on its outside option from not investing in
the region. That is, the two governments just have some common expectations about
the proﬁtability of an alternative location outside the region for the foreign multina-
tional. If governments are not able to elicit information from the ﬁrm, however, the
uncertainty about the value of such an outside option simply resolves into a further
constraint that they may have to take into account when competing for FDI. A more
interesting situation, instead, occurs when the ﬁscal policy of the host country indirectly
aﬀects the value of the outside option. If, for example, the outside option of the foreign
multinational is given by the possibility of not investing abroad, operating just in its
residence country and paying taxes at some unknown rate there, proﬁt shifting creates
a link between the ﬁscal policies of the residence and of the host country. Hence, the
18In general, when countries face a set of ﬁrms heterogeneous with respect to their infrastructure
needs, they have an incentive to diﬀerentiate to the maximum extent as this allows them to reduce the
dissipation of welfare resulting from subsequent tax competition. In such a sense, infrastructure compe-
tition can relax tax competition in the same way as product diﬀerentiation can relax price competition
between ﬁrms. Hindiks et al. (2008), however, show that the opposite result may hold under revenue
sharing when countries are heterogeneous ex ante in their capacity to attract capital. In particular,
countries strategically choose to under-invest in public infrastructure as they anticipate that public in-
vestments, by enhancing the productivity of capital, will exacerbate subsequent capital tax competition.
See Dembour (2008) for a recent survey of the literature about tax and infrastructure competition.
19Bond and Samuelson (1986), e.g., analyze a situation where the ﬁrm is uncertain as to the produc-
tivity of the country where it will potentially invest, and show that tax holidays are an optimal means
by which high-productivity countries can reveal their type.
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host country might be able to design a ﬁscal policy which induce truthful revelation by
the foreign ﬁrm. But this goes beyond the scope of our model and represents a task for
future research.
Appendix
No proﬁt shifting
Policy-competition-for-FDI equilibrium
The problem of country 푖’s government under the three forms of policy competition we
analyze can be generally formulated in the following way:
max
푡푖(휋푖)
푡푖 (휋푖)
s.t. Π푖 − 푡푖 (휋푖) ≥ Π푗 − 푡푗 (휋푗) , 푖, 푗 = 퐴,퐵, 푖 ∕= 푗
where the ﬁscal policy implemented by country 푖, 푡푖 (휋푖), is a function of the proﬁts the
multinational ﬁrm declares to country 푖’s tax authorities.
The policy-competition-for-FDI game between countries 퐴 and 퐵 is a Bertrand-
competition-like game in prices with multiple equilibria. In particular, the equilibrium
can be deﬁned as follows
푡∗퐴 (휋퐴) = 휖, with 휖 ∈ (0,∞)
푡∗퐵 (휋퐵) = Π퐵 −Π퐴
The proof is a straightforward application of the Bertrand-competition solution. Indeed,
for country 퐴, any 휖 ∈ (0,∞) is a best reply to country 퐵’s equilibrium strategy since
퐴’s payoﬀ is always nil, i.e., it can never attract the foreign investor. For country 퐵, any
other strategy 푡′퐵 (⋅) such that 푡′퐵 (⋅) > Π퐵−Π퐴 > 0 is not an equilibrium strategy since
country 퐴 will have the opportunity of attracting FDI by setting 푡∗퐴 (⋅) = 휖 < 푡′퐵 (⋅). By
contrast, any other strategy 푡′퐵 (⋅) < Π퐵 − Π퐴 is not a best reply to 푡∗퐴 (⋅) because it
leaves money on the table, i.e., to the foreign multinational ﬁrm.
Proof of Proposition 1
When (1− 푡퐴) Π퐴 > (1− 푡퐵) Π퐵, the foreign multinational invests in country 퐴 in the
absence of policy competition and regional welfare is given by 푊푅퐴 = 푡퐴Π퐴. Competition
between countries changes the FDI decision of the foreign multinational and regional
welfare amounts to 푊푅퐵 = Π퐵−Π퐴. We want to show that Π퐵−Π퐴 > 푡퐴Π퐴 may hold,
in which case policy competition increases regional welfare. For this to be possible, two
conditions have to be satisﬁed:
(i) the foreign investor chooses to invest in country 퐴 in the absence of policy com-
petition if and only if
Π퐵 <
1− 푡퐴
1− 푡퐵Π퐴
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that is if the gain in before-tax proﬁts from investing in 퐵 cannot compensate for
the ﬁscal disadvantage of operating in the high-tax country;
(ii) regional welfare increases if and only if
Π퐵 > (1 + 푡퐴) Π퐴
Therefore, policy competition increases regional welfare by inducing the ﬁrm to invest in
the location-advantageous country if and only if the last two conditions simultaneously
hold, that is if and only if
1− 푡퐴
1− 푡퐵 > 1 + 푡퐴 ⇐⇒ 푡퐵 > 푡ˆ퐵 (푡퐴) ≡
2푡퐴
1 + 푡퐴
≥ 푡퐴
For 푡퐵 ∈
[
푡퐴, 푡ˆ퐵
)
, any kind of policy competition decreases regional welfare, whereas
the opposite holds true for 푡퐵 ∈
(
푡ˆ퐵, 1
)
.
Proﬁt shifting
Subsidy competition
If country 퐵’s location advantage is more important for the foreign ﬁrm than proﬁt
shifting opportunities, i.e., condition (13) holds, country 퐴 can never succeed in attract-
ing FDI even by bidding its maximum lump-sum subsidy 푆푚푎푥퐴 . On the other hand,
if condition (13) does not hold, it is country 퐵 that can never win the competition
for FDI. Hence, similarly to the no-proﬁt-shifting case, the equilibrium of the subsidy-
competition-for-FDI game between countries 퐴 and 퐵 can be deﬁned as follows
푆∗푖 = 휖, with 휖 ∈ (0, 푆푚푎푥푖 )
푆˜∗푗 : Π
푗(푆˜∗푗 ) = Π
푖 (푆푚푎푥푖 ) , for 푖, 푗 = 퐴,퐵, 푖 ∕= 푗
The proof is once again a straightforward application of the Bertrand-competition solu-
tion. Indeed, depending on condition (13), one of the two countries, say country 푖, can
never attract the foreign investor. For country 푖, any bid 휖 ∈ (0, 푆푚푎푥푖 ) is a best reply to
country 푗’s equilibrium strategy since 푖’s payoﬀ is always equal to zero. For country 푗,
any other strategy 푆′푗 < 푆˜
∗
푗 is not an equilibrium strategy since country 푖 will have the
opportunity of attracting FDI by setting 푆푚푎푥푖 , which would imply Π
푖 (푆푚푎푥푖 ) > Π
푗(푆′푗).
By contrast, any other strategy 푆′푗 > 푆˜
∗
푗 is not a best reply to 푆
∗
푖 because it leaves to
the foreign ﬁrm an extra-beneﬁt that country 푗 could extract.
Perfect tax discrimination or non-linear-tax competition
Under non-linear tax competition, country 퐵’s government chooses the tax pair (휏퐵, 푇퐵)
which maximizes the revenue it can collect by taxing the foreign multinational. Such
a choice is constrained by the tax pair set by country 퐴. Hence, for country 퐵 to
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win, its oﬀer has to outbid the competing country’s best oﬀer, which is represented by
(휏퐴, 푇퐴) = (0, 0). We substitute the latter into condition (10) to get the constraint for
country 퐵’s maximization problem, which can be written as
max
휏퐵 ,푇퐵
휏퐵휋퐵 + 푇퐵
s.t. (1− 휏퐵) Π퐵 − 휏퐵 (2푡퐹 − 휏퐵)
2훾
− 푇퐵 ≥ Π퐴
where 휋퐵 = Π퐵 − 휏퐵−푡퐹훾 from the ﬁrm’s proﬁt declaration choice. Denoting by 휆 the
Lagrange multiplier for the constraint of this problem, the corresponding Lagrangian
function is
퐿 = 휏퐵Π퐵 − 휏퐵 휏퐵 − 푡퐹
훾
+ 푇퐵 + 휆
[
(1− 휏퐵) Π퐵 − 휏퐵 (2푡퐹 − 휏퐵)
2훾
− 푇퐵 −Π퐴
]
and ﬁrst-order and complementary slackness conditions are
∂퐿
∂휏퐵
= 0 ⇐⇒ Π퐵 − 2휏퐵 − 푡퐹
훾
− 휆Π퐵 − 휆푡퐹 − 휏퐵
훾
= 0
∂퐿
∂푇퐵
= 0 ⇐⇒ 휆 = 1
휆
[
(1− 휏퐵) Π퐵 − 휏퐵 (2푡퐹 − 휏퐵)
2훾
− 푇퐵 −Π퐴
]
= 0, 휆 ≥ 0
Since 휆 = 1, the constraint always holds with equality, and the ﬁrst condition reduces
to − 휏퐵훾 = 0, from which it follows that 휏∗퐵 = 0. Hence, it is straightforward to conclude
that country 퐵’s welfare maximizing ﬁscal package is given by
(휏∗퐵, 푇
∗
퐵) = (0,Π퐵 −Π퐴)
Such a tax pair always induces the multinational to invest in 퐵 and leads to a welfare
in that country (and in the region as a whole) equal to 푊퐵퐵 = 푊
푅,푇푎푥
퐵 = Π퐵 −Π퐴.
This is the equilibrium of the non-linear-tax-competition-for-FDI game between
countries 퐴 and 퐵. Indeed, it is always possible for country 퐵 to post a bid such
that country 퐴 can never attract the foreign investor. Any ﬁscal package (휏 ′퐵, 푇
′
퐵) which
leaves lower after-tax proﬁts to the foreign ﬁrm is not an equilibrium strategy for coun-
try 퐵 as it gives country 퐴 the opportunity of attracting FDI with its best oﬀer (or even
less). A ﬁscal package more generous than (휏∗퐵, 푇
∗
퐵), instead, would leave money to the
ﬁrm. For country 퐴, then, any bid (휏퐴, 푇퐴) is a best reply to country 퐵’s equilibrium
strategy since 퐴’s payoﬀ is always nil.
Tax discrimination or tax competition
Under tax discrimination, the two governments just compete over the rate 휏푖 at which
the multinational ﬁrm’s declared proﬁts are taxed, and the problem of country 퐵’s
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government is given by
max
휏퐵
휏퐵휋퐵
s.t. (1− 휏퐵) Π퐵 + (휏퐵 − 휏퐴) (휏 − 푡퐹 )
훾
≥ (1− 휏퐴) Π퐴
where 휋퐵 = Π퐵− 휏퐵−푡퐹훾 from (5). Since we are dealing with a single-variable maximiza-
tion problem with one constraint, the solution is either an unconstrained maximum -
resulting from the maximization of the objective function without the constraint - or it
comes from the constraint itself, which is binding. But if the constraint is not binding,
there is no real competition for FDI between countries and the latter resolves into a
new tax instrument for country 퐵. Hence, we just consider the binding situation and
we deﬁne
푓 (휏퐴, 휏퐵) ≡ (1− 휏퐵) Π퐵 + (휏퐵 − 휏퐴) (휏 − 푡퐹 )
훾
− (1− 휏퐴) Π퐴 = 0
so that the solution to country 퐵’s problem is given by
휏∗퐵 (휏퐴) = 훾Π퐵 + 푡퐹 ±
√
(훾Π퐵 + 푡퐹 )
2 + 휏퐴 (휏퐴 − 2푡퐹 )− 2훾 [Π퐵 − (1− 휏퐴) Π퐴]
which, given country 퐴’s best oﬀer to the foreign ﬁrm, i.e., 휏퐴 = 0, reduces to
휏∗퐵 (0) = 훾Π퐵 + 푡퐹 ±
√
(훾Π퐵 + 푡퐹 )
2 − 2훾 (Π퐵 −Π퐴)
Note that 푓 (⋅, ⋅) is a convex function of 휏퐵 which is increasing for 휏퐵 > 훾Π퐵 + 푡퐹 . If
the two roots that we have just deﬁned do not exist, this means that 푓 (⋅, ⋅) > 0, i.e.,
the after-tax proﬁts from investing in 퐵 always exceed those from investing in 퐴, hence
country 퐵 always attracts FDI for any 휏퐵 it sets. If the two roots exist, instead, they
will both be positive, but the only acceptable solution is the smaller one as the larger one
violates the non-negative-proﬁt-declaration condition, which requires 휏퐵 < 훾Π퐵 + 푡퐹 .
Therefore, country 퐵 always attracts FDI by setting
휏∗퐵 (0) ≡ 휏ˆ퐵 = 훾Π퐵 + 푡퐹 −
√
(훾Π퐵 + 푡퐹 )
2 − 2훾 (Π퐵 −Π퐴)
and regional welfare is given by 푊푅퐵,퐷푖푠푐 = 푊
퐵
퐵 = 휏ˆ퐵
(
Π퐵 − 휏ˆ퐵−푡퐹훾
)
= Π퐵 − Π퐴 − 휏ˆ
2
퐵
2훾
where the last equality is obtained by using 푓 (0, 휏퐵) = 0.
The equilibrium of the tax-discrimination game between countries 퐴 and 퐵 can be
deﬁned as follows:
휏∗퐴 = 휖, with 휖 ∈ (0,∞)
휏ˆ퐵 : Π
퐵(휏ˆ퐵) = Π
퐴 (0)
Indeed, it is always possible for country 퐵 to set a tax rate such that country 퐴 can never
attract the foreign investor. Any 휏퐵 > 휏ˆ퐵 is not an equilibrium strategy for country 퐵
as it gives country 퐴 the opportunity of attracting FDI with its best oﬀer, i.e., 휏퐴 = 0.
By contrast, any 휏퐵 < 휏ˆ퐵 would leave money to the ﬁrm. For country 퐴, then, any
휏퐴 ∈ (0,∞) is a best reply to 휏ˆ퐵 since 퐴 always earns a zero payoﬀ.
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